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1 	 2 
METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR DYNAMIC 	 While a variety of systems and methods are known (such 
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 	 as, e.g., shown in the below-listed patents and references), 
there is a continued need for improved systems and methods. 
The present application claims priority under 35 U.S.C. 
119 to U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/750,001, filed on 
Dec. 13, 2005, entitled Method and System for Dynamic 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment and to U.S. Provisional Appli-
cation No. 60/637,847, filed on Dec. 21, 2004, entitled 
Method and System for Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assess-
ment, the entire disclosures of which prior provisional appli-
cations are incorporated herein by reference. 
This present invention was made with United States Gov-
ernment support under contract number NASI-02076 
awarded by NASA. The United States government has certain 
rights in the present invention. 
BACKGROUND 
1. Field of the Invention 
The present application relates to systems and methods for 
performing risk assessment. 
2. Background Discussion 
The "Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for 
NASA Managers and Practitioners" defines Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment (PRA) as follows: "Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logi-
cal analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks 
in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-
effectively improving their safety and performance." A PRA 
model often uses a combination of Event Tree (which repre-
sents a complex super system of events) and Fault Tree 
(which represents sub systems of events) models to analyze 
potential failure scenarios to determine their probability of 
occurrence, which when combined with an analysis of their 
effects, provides a quantitative assessment of risk. The com-
bination of ET and FT models has proven effective for the 
analysis of a variety of critical systems, most notably in the 
nuclear and aerospace communities. Several software tools 
support the ET/FT combination for PRA, including QRAS 
(by Item software) (see, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 6,223,143, Apr. 24, 
2001, Quantitative risk assessment system (QRAS)) and 
SAPHIRE (by INEL). 
With the increasing use of computer-based systems for 
critical applications, the FT method has expanded to allow for 
the analysis of failure modes and effects that are unique to 
these systems. The expansion of the FT methodology to allow 
the analysis of computer-based systems has resulted in the 
DFT (Dynamic Fault Tree) methodology. The DFT method-
ology is seeing increased use in research and industry for a 
variety of applications. DFT analysis is fully supported by the 
GALILEO software tool (see, e.g., K. Sullivan, et al., "The 
Galileo Fault Tree Analysis Tool," ftcs p. 232; Twenty-Ninth 
Annual International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Comput-
ing, 1999); in addition, both RELEX and RELIASOFT pro-
vide some support for DFT constructs in their reliability 
analysis software. 
In the present application, a new methodology and system 
(referred to herein as DEFT) allows, among other things, the 
combination of ET and DFT models for dynamic PRA. DEFT 
defines the mathematical model that results when the DFT 
model replaces the FT model within the ET framework. 
Among other things, the methodology and system effectively 
extends the PRA methodology to allow its application to 
complex computer-based systems.  
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dynamic fault tree models," Proceeding of Annual Reli-
ability and Maintainability Symposium, pp 64-70, Jan. 
20 	 13-16,1997. 
C6. Zhihua Tang, "Common Cause Failure analysis and 
Improved Solution Techniques for Dynamic Fault Trees," 
M.S. thesis, pp. 25-26, University of Virginia, May 2002. 
C7. NASA Johnson Space Center, Safety, Reliability, and 
25 Quality Assurance Office (NA) and Space Shuttle Division 
(NC), Contract No. NAS9-19180, Auxiliary Power Unit 
(APU) Subsystem System analysis Notebook," Space 
Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment, SPRAT SYS-13. 
30 	 SUMMARY OF THE PREFERRED 
EMBODIMENTS 
The preferred embodiments of the present invention can 
significantly improve upon existing methods and/or appara-
35 ruses. 
According to some aspects of some of the embodiments of 
the present invention, a method, system and computer read-
able medium provides for dynamic probabilistic risk assess-
ment (PRA) that, among other things, extends the traditional 
40 PRA methodology to allow the analysis of computer-based 
systems. Prior PRA methodologies depend on a combination 
of event trees and fault trees to model system failure and 
success scenarios as a combination of constituent events. 
Prior PRA methodologies lack the capabilities needed to 
45 analyze computer-based systems, particularly with respect to 
dependencies between events. In some preferred embodi-
ments, a dynamic PRA method extends the event tree/fault 
tree method to account for such dependencies as functional 
dependencies and shared spares. 
50 The Dynamic PRA method, system and computer readable 
medium allows for, among other things, the use of the top 
node of DFT (dynamic fault tree) models (which represent 
sub systems of events) as pivot nodes in the overall event tree 
risk model (which represents a complex super system of 
55 events). The DFT model extends the traditional FT model 
with special constructs for dependencies, including, e.g., hot, 
cold and warm spares (see FIG. 17). In preferred embodi-
ments, the Dynamic PRA methodology carefully constructs a 
set of Markov models and logic models for failure scenario. 
6o The dynamic PRA methodology determines the probability 
of occurrence of each scenario. 
In the preferred embodiments, the dynamic PRA method-
ology and system extends the PRA methodology to support 
the analysis of critical computer-based systems. 
65 In summary, some uses of some of the embodiments of the 
present invention method, system and computer readable 
medium provides for, but not limited thereto, the following: 
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Many government agencies or other entities may benefit by 
use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) during the devel-
opment of critical systems. These critical systems include, 
e.g., aerospace systems, chemical process systems, nuclear 
systems, medical devices, etc. Process control systems (such 
as those used for chemical processes) also often need to be 
evaluated for risk. 
As critical systems become more dependent on computer 
implementations, their risk assessment becomes more com-
plex. Traditional PRA methods cannot adequately account for 
the special failure modes and behaviors of computer based 
systems. Thus, there was prior to the present invention a 
need for a method for probabilistic risk assessment of critical 
computer-based systems. 
Software tools for PRA are provided by several vendors. 
These include the above-noted ITEM software, RELEX soft-
ware and RELIASOFT. The companies that provide these 
latter software products, would be interested in the method-
ologies described in the present application. By way of 
example, ITEM, would benefit because they market QRAS, 
the PRA tool that is recommended by NASA to its safety and 
mission assurance practitioners. Among other things, the pre-
ferred embodiments herein involving dynamic PRA method-
ologies would complement QRAS nicely. 
According to some embodiments, a method for calculating 
Probabalistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of a complex super 
system through the use of an event tree (ET) having one or 
more individual paths and whose event nodes are top events of 
Static Fault Trees (SET) and Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) is 
performed that includes: calculating the probability of vari-
ous paths of said event tree (ET) by calculating the probability 
of various event nodes of the individual paths of said event 
tree (ET). 
In some examples, the method includes: said event tree 
(ET) is a binary tree; said event nodes comprising internal 
nodes, wherein said internal nodes represent mitigating or 
aggravating events in said complex super system; and said 
event nodes comprising leaf nodes, wherein said leaf nodes 
represent failure of said complex super system, non-failure of 
said complex super system, or non-occurring conditions in 
said complex super system. In some further examples, said 
Static Fault Trees (SET) is a structured graph of an SET sub 
system of events of said complex super system, said Static 
Fault Trees (SET) top events represent a failure in a compo-
nent corresponding to an event of said complex super system, 
and said Static Fault Trees (SET) comprises one or more SET 
child events, wherein said child events are sub events of said 
complex super system and wherein said one or more SET 
child events are connected by ordinary Boolean AND, OR 
and/or N/K gates. In some further examples, the method 
includes said Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) is a structured 
graph of a DFT sub system of events of said complex super 
system, said Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) top event represents 
a failure in a component corresponding to an event of said 
complex super system, and said Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) 
comprises one or more child events, wherein said child events 
are sub events of said complex super system and wherein said 
one or more child events are connected by the gates compris-
ing: Functional Dependency Gates (FDEP gates) (see, e.g., 
Dugan, J. B. et al., "Dynamic Fault Tree Analysis of a Recon-
figurable Software System, University of Virginia, FIGS. 3, 4 
and 5) wherein said FDEP gates model situations where one 
component's correct operation is dependent upon the correct 
operation of some other component, Spare Gates (SP gates), 
wherein said SP gates for model cold, warm and hot pooled 
spares, Priority AND (PAND) wherein said PAND gates 
model ordered ANDing of events. 
6 
In some further examples; the calculation of the probability 
of one or more pivot nodes of said complex super system that 
are top events of SFTs which have no sub events of said 
complex super system in common comprises inclusion/ex- 
5 clusion probability analysis or Binary Decision Diagram 
(BDD) analysis. See, e.g., Appendix A below. In some further 
examples, the calculation of the probability of two or more 
pivot nodes of said complex super system that are top events 
of SFTs which have shared sub events of said complex super 
l0 
system consists of ANDING said SET pivot nodes along the 
path and applying inclusion/exclusion probability analysis or 
Binary Decision Diagram analysis (see, e.g., Appendix A) 
Moreover, in some further examples, the calculation of the 
15 probability of one or more pivot nodes (see, e.g., Dugan, J. B. 
et al., "Integrating Event Trees and Dynamic Fault Trees: 
Technical Feasibility Study," University of Virginia, p. 4) of 
said complex super system are top events of DFTS that have 
no shared sub events of said complex super system is calcu- 
20 lated via modularization using a combination of BDD and 
Markov Chain (MC) analysis. Modularization can be accom-
plished using the GALILEO software (see http://www.cs.vir-
ginia.edu/—ftree/index.html and http://www.fault-tree.net/ 
papers/sullivan-galileo-fta-tool.pdf). The mathematics of 
25 modularization and the application of BDD and Markov 
Chain analysis is described in A Modular Approach for 
Analyzing Static and Dynamic fault Trees" 1997. See also 
"Event Trees and Dynamic Fault Trees." In some further 
examples, in the calculation of the probability of two or more 
30 pivot nodes of said complex super system are top events of 
DFTs that have shared sub events of said complex super 
system is produced by ANDing the DFTs to produce a third 
DFT. In yet some further examples, the probability of said 
third DFT is calculated using a combination of BDD and 
35 Markov Chain (MC) analysis. And, in yet some further 
examples, for a DFT the negation of a spare gate is the 
negation of the logical output of the gate; the negation of a 
PAND gate with inputs A and B means thatA did not occur, B 
did not occur or A occurred after B; if the PAND is true for 
40 simultaneous events, then the negation of the PAND is not; 
and the negation of the DFT constraints, such as FDEP, SEQ 
(Sequence Enforcing constraint) and CCG (common-cause 
group) is inconsequential, since none of the constraints has a 
logical output. 
45 	 The above and/or other aspects, features and/or advantages 
of various embodiments will be further appreciated in view of 
the following description in conjunction with the accompa-
nying Figures. Various embodiments can include and/or 
exclude different aspects, features and/or advantages where 
50 applicable. In addition, various embodiments can combine 
one or more aspect or feature of other embodiments where 
applicable. The descriptions of aspects, features and/or 
advantages of particular embodiments should not be con-
strued as limiting other embodiments or the claims. 
55 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
The preferred embodiments of the present invention are 
shown by a way of example, and not limitation, in the accom-
60 panying Figures, in which: 
FIG.1 depicts an event tree for a propellant supply system. 
FIG. 2 depicts a Static Fault Tree for a washing machine 
system. 
FIG. 3 depicts an event tree for a washing machine system. 
65 	 FIG. 4 depicts a combined SET and ET for a static coherent 
system. 
FIG. 5 depicts the FT of two dependent subsystems. 
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FIG. 6 depicts a combined DFT and ET with no static 	 described herein with the understanding that the present dis- 
subsystems and no shared events. 	 closure is to be considered as providing examples of the 
FIG. 7 depicts a combined ET and DFT with no shared 	 principles of the various inventions described herein and that 
events. 	 such examples are not intended to limit the invention to pre- 
FIG. 8 depicts DFTs for three subsystems of a dynamic 5 ferred embodiments described herein and/or illustrated 
system with shared events. 	 herein. 
FIG. 9 depicts the Markov Chain (MC) for the dynamic 	 As system analysis methodologies, both event tree analysis 
module. 	 (ETA) and fault tree analysis (ETA) are used in probabilistic 
FIG. 10 depicts the ET (Event Tree) for the dynamic mod- 	 risk assessment (PRA), especially in identifying system inter- 
ule. 	 10 relationships due to shared events. Although there are differ- 
FIG. 11 depicts the ET (Event Tree) for the static module. 	 ences between them, ETA and ETA, are so closely linked that 
FIG. 12 depicts the basic events of Fault Trees, both 
	
fault trees (FT) are often used to quantify system events that 
dynamic and static. 	 are part of event tree (ET) sequences (Ref 1). The logical 
FIG. 13 depicts the Static Fault Tree logic gates. 	 processes employed to evaluate ET sequences and quantify 
FIG. 14 gives a graphical representation of inclusion/ex-  15 the consequences are the same as those used in ETA. 
clusion analysis for the probability P(A u B u Q. 	 Although much work has been done to combine FT and ET, 
FIG. 15 depicts minimal cutsets (MCS) of fault trees. 	 traditional methods only concentrate on combining static 
FIG. 16 depicts a Binary Decision Diagram representation 	 fault trees (SET) and ET. Note that Static Fault Trees (SET) 
of a Static Fault Tree. For an introduction to BDDs, see 	 useAND, OR and N/K gates to link their sub system of events 
Anderson, H. R., `An Introduction to Binary Decision Dia-  20 as depicted in FIG. 12. 
grams," Lecture notes for 49285 Advanced Algorithms E97, 	 Our main concern is considering how to combine dynamic 
Department of Information Technology, Technical University 	 fault trees (DFT) and ET. Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) use 
of Denmark Building 344, DK-2800 Lyngby, Denmark, 	 FDEP, SPARE and PAND gates to link their subsystem of 
October 1997. For example, any Boolean expression (includ- 	 events as depicted in FIGS. 17, 18 and 19. We proposed a 
ing Static Fault Trees) can be represented by a unique BDD, 25 reasonable approach in this section, which is illustrated 
which is a direct acyclic graph (DAG). If a node of a BDD is 	 through a hypothetical example. Because of the complexity 
true, the path to its right child is traversed. Otherwise, the path 	 of dynamic systems, including the huge size and complicated 
to its left child is traversed. BDDs are used to calculate the 	 dependencies, there may exist contradictions among different 
probability of a top event of an SET, as will be shown later. 	 dynamic subsystems. One noteworthy benefit of our 
FIG. 17 depicts the symbol for a Functional Dependency 30 approach is that we avoid the generation of such contradic- 
gate, one of the gates used in Dynamic Fault Trees. 	 tions in our model. Another notable benefit is that efficiency 
FIG. 18 depicts a spare (SP) gate, one of the gates used in 	 may be improved through modularization. Other benefits 
Dynamic Fault Trees. Hot spares should have failure rates 	 would be appreciated based on this disclosure by those in the 
similar to those of primary components. Warm spares should 	 art. 
have slower failure rates. Cold spares are usually assumed not 35 
to fail before usage. 	 1. Introduction 
FIG. 19 depicts a PAND gate, one of the gates used in 
Dynamic Fault Trees. 	 An ET is a graphical representation of mitigating or aggra- 
FIG. 20 depicts an example event tree. 	 vating events that may occur in response to some initiating 
FIG. 21 depicts the fault tree structures of all three pivot 40 event or perturbation in the system. It represents a complex 
events in ET. 	 super system of events. As the number of events increases, the 
FIG. 22 depicts the BDD and DBDD structures of pivot 	 picture fans out like the branches of a tree (See Refs. A2, A3 
events. 	 listed above). ETA was first introduced for the nuclear indus- 
FIG. 23 depicts the BDD structure of outcome. 	 try and since then has been applied in diverse industries. ETA 
FIG. 24 depicts a Markov Chain for a standby system. 	 45 techniques are helpful to identify the consequences that can 
FIG. 25 depicts a simple fault tree for modularization. 	 result in the following occurrence of a potentially hazardous 
FIG. 26 depicts Modularizing a dynamic fault tree. 	 event. FIG.1 is a simple illustrative and non-limiting example 
FIG. 27 depicts FT of two branch points of an ET. 	 of a propellant supply system (see Ref. A2 listed above). The 
FIG. 28 depicts the ET of the hydraulic system. 	 initiating event is the induced hazard "inadvertent release of 
FIG. 29 depicts FT structures. 	 5o hydrogen," which forms the beginning of the ET. From here, 
FIG. 30(A) depicts a Markov Chain for the whole system. 	 the tree branches into the two possible responses that the 
FIG. 30(B) depicts a Markov Chain for module 1. 	 hydrogen detector can have, namely to detect or not to detect 
FIG. 31 is a schematic diagram that represents an illustra- 	 the released hydrogen. Each of these possible events in turn 
tive and non-limiting method for calculating the Probabilistic 	 branches into the two possible states that the cutoff valve can 
Risk Assessment (PRA) of a complex super system. 	 55 either close or remain open when commanded shut. As the 
FIG. 32(A) shows an illustrative multi-user client server 	 Figure indicates, hydrogen is contained only along the path in 
system with which some embodiments of the present inven- 	 which both the detector and cutoff valve operate. 
tion can be implemented. 	 A FT is another kind of graphical representation, represent- 
FIG. 32(B) shows an illustrative computer 320 that can be 	 ing a sub system of events, which is constructed by defining 
used to implement computerized process steps in some 60 the TOP undesired event and then using backward logic to 
embodiments of the invention. 	 define causes. Basic events at the bottom of the fault tree are 
linked via logic symbols (known as gates) to one or more 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED 
	
higher-level events (see Ref A2 listed above) (see FIG. 13 for 
EMBODIMENTS 
	
SET gates and FIGS. 17, 18 and 19 for DFT gates). ETA 
65 techniques have been widely adopted by a wide range of 
While the present invention may be embodied in many 	 engineering disciplines as one of the primary methods of 
different forms, a number of illustrative embodiments are 	 performing reliability and safety analysis. 
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FIG. 2 is a simple illustrative and non-limiting example of 
SET for a hypothetical washing machine system. The FT 
structure function for the example is that the system would 
fail (i.e., overflow) if eitherthe valve fails OR both the timeout 
control and the full sensor fail. 
Although ETA and ETA are quite different in the structure 
forms, the logic orders and so on, they are often used together. 
The standard approach to combine FT and ET is that the 
branch point (pivot/internal node) of an ET can be treated as 
a FT. The probability of the top event of the FT serves as the 
branch probability for the ET. In dealing with FTs, much 
work has been done involving minimal cut set (MCS) (see, 
e.g., FIG. 15) or prime implicant (PI) based methods (see, 
e.g., Ref A7 listed above). J. D. Andrews and S. J. Dunnett 
proposed a BDD-based approach to combine SET and ET so 
as to overcome the inefficiency and inaccuracy of previous 
methods for non-coherent systems (see Refs. Al, A4, A5 
listed above). Among other things, one goal herein was to 
consider the possibility and a feasible way to combine DFT 
and ET, which had not been studied in previous work. 
The following sections of this document include: Section 2 
which involves a brief comparison of ET and FT to indicate 
their relationship (under the heading A Brief Comparison of 
ET and FT); Section 3 (under the heading Previous Work to 
Combine SET and ET); identifications of three different cases 
to consider when combining FT and ET, including static 
systems, dynamic systems with no shared events and 
dynamic systems with shared events. In order to illustrate the 
3rd case that includes dynamic subsystems and shared events, 
a hypothetical example is used and analyzed in Section 4 
(under the heading COMBINE DFT AND ET). 
2. A Brief Comparison of ET and FT 
ET and FT are quite different in many aspects. An ET is an 
inductive or forward logic representation, which starts from 
an initiating event and includes all possible paths, whose 
branch points represent successes and failures (sometimes 
can also represent partial failures). The quantification of an 
ET is used to predict the frequency of each outcome (See Ref 
Al listed above). While a FT is a deductive or backward logic 
representation, which involves specifying a top event to ana-
lyze (e.g., always a system failure), followed by identifying 
all of the associated elements in the system that could cause 
that top event to occur. 
Although there exist differences between ET and FT, they 
are closely related to each other. The first thing is that the 
same system can be represented either by an ET or a FT. FIG. 
3 shows the ET structure for the same washing machine 
system in FIG. 2, whose outcomes tell us that the system 
would fail if either the end point Fl or F2 occurs, namely both 
the timeout control and the full sensor fail OR the valve fails. 
The second connection between FT and ET is that the 
branch point events of an ET can be defined using FT struc-
tures. We are more interested in this point and will discuss 
three cases below. 
3. Previous Work to Combine SET and ET 
Some researchers have realized the benefit and possibility 
of combining FT and ET for PRA. For a static coherent 
system where the branch point events of an ET are indepen-
dent of each other, quantification is easy to achieve by mul-
tiplying the frequency of the initiator and the probabilities of 
passing along each branch leading to an outcome scenario. 
The exact probability of each branch point can be obtained by 
Inclusion-Exclusion Expansion (IEE) approach given in 
10 
Equation (1). C,, is the MCS (minimal cut set see, e.g., FIG. 
15), while P(T) is the top event probability. FIG. 4 shows the 
process to combine SET and ET for a simple static coherent 
system. In the ET shown in FIG. 4(c), each branch point is 
5 replaced with a SET. 
P(T) _ 	 (1 ) 
10 L J Pwi) - 
 LJ LJ  P(ci ci ) +  LJ LJ LJ  P(ci ci co + 
i=1 	 all i<j 	 all i<j<k 
+ (- i rl P(c, n c2 n ... n cn) 
15 	 If a static coherent system is very large, approximation 
calculating is adopted to yield a result of acceptable accuracy, 
either using IEE by truncating terms after the first or second 
one or using MCS upper-bound shown in equation (2) 
20 
(2) 
P(T) <- 1 - 
F1 
 (1 - P(ci ) 
i=, 
25 
However, the approaches used in a static coherent system 
are not useful for a static non-coherent system, such as a 
system shown in FIG. 5, whose subsystems Xl and X2 have 
some shared events. Because the convergence of IEE can be 
30 very slow and truncating a large number of terms will lead to 
inaccuracy, therefore J. D. Andrews and S. J. Dunnettprovide 
a BDD-based approach, which overcomes these shortcom-
ings (see Ref Al as listed above). 
35 	 4. Combine DFT and ET 
So far, all cases above only concentrate on static systems; 
no research has considered the relationship between DFT and 
ET. Although various solution techniques have been utilized 
40 in DFT analysis (see Ref AS as listed above), the question is 
can we use these techniques to combine DFT and ET? If yes, 
how? In this section we will look at some dynamic systems, 
and use MC (Markov Chain), the normal tool to show our 
idea. 
45 4.1 Combine DFT and ET without Shared Events 
For dynamic systems where no dependencies exist in dif-
ferent subsystems, each subsystem can be resolved sepa-
rately, either using a MC for any subsystem, or a MC (Markov 
Chain) for a dynamic one and a combinatorial tool such as 
5o BDD for a static one. For simplicity, only MC is used in our 
example. 
Since each state in a MC represents either UP or DOWN of 
the corresponding subsystem, it is easy to represent any 
branch point of an ET via MC, with UP states representing the 
55 positive branch point and DOWN states representing the 
negative branch point. 
Two illustrative examples are given in FIG. 6 and FIG. 7, 
one with only dynamic subsystems, the other with both static 
and dynamic subsystems. Since no common or shared events 
6o across two or more branch point events, the methods applied 
in the two examples are the same. 
4.2 Combine DFT and ET with Shared Events 
For dynamic systems with shared events, on one hand, like 
static non-coherent systems, we cannot treat subsystems 
65 independently due to the dependencies. On the other hand, 
unlike the BDD-based approach (Binary Decision Dia- 
gram see FIG. 16) used in a static system, De Morgan's 
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Laws are not suitable for dynamic systems. For a good intro-
duction to BDDs, see `An Introduction to Binary Decision 
Diagrams (BDD).". In summary, any Boolean expression (in-
cluding Static Fault Trees) can be represented by a unique 
BDD, which is a direct acyclic graph (DAG). If a node of a 
BDD is true, the pathto its right child is traversed. Otherwise, 
the path to its left child is traversed. BDDs are used to calcu-
late the probability of a top event of an SET. Therefore, we are 
now facing two problems: one is to avoid constructing a 
single MC for each subsystem both because of the dependen-
cies and the unnecessary redundant work due to shared 
events; the other is to look for a way to represent all branch 
points of an ET, especially the negative points. Furthermore, 
it is unreasonable to construct one MC for the whole system 
due to the obvious disadvantage of MC that the size would 
face a state-space explosion problem with the increase of the 
number of events. A feasible and efficient way is to make use 
of the concept of modularizationby analyzing all related units 
within one module, and deal with all non-related modules 
independently (see Refs. A6, A9 listed above). 
This methodology is illustrated by a hypothetical bank 
account-access example shown in FIG. 8, FIG. 9 and FIG. 10. 
Three subsystems Xl, X2 and X3 are depicted in FIG. 
8(a)-(c). XI describes the failure of the first way to access a 
bank account, which is achieved by a customer operating 
his/her own personal computer through Internet. X2 means 
the failure of the second way, through a teller operating one of 
all three terminals in the bank. The third way occurs under an 
emergency situation, done by the bank computer system man-
ager operating on a server directly, whose failure structure is 
represented by X3. Basic event names are defined in table 1. 
For Xl, the top event may be caused by either the failure of 
the personal computer or the failures of both the two bank 
servers, whose normal working conditions both depend on 
the power supply service. Once the local power cannot be 
supplied, UPS will continue to provide the power a period of 
time long enough. For X2, the top event will happen if all 
three terminals cannot be used (may due to the hardware 
reason or being unavailable of all tellers in the bank) or there 
are some problems with the two servers. For X3, since the 
system manager can work on the servers directly, the occur-
rence of the top event is simple to analyze. Based on FIG. 8, 
both XI and X2 include two parts, one is a static part in the 
dotted circle on the left, the other is a dynamic part in the 
dotted circle on the right shown in FIGS. 8 (a) and (b); X3 is 
only composed of one dynamic part. After considering all 
shared events among these parts, we combine all related 
dynamic parts to obtain one module, and combine all non-
related static parts to obtain another module. For the new-
formed dynamic module, we use MC shown in FIG. 9 and the 
corresponding ET shown in FIG. 10 to explain the details of 
our idea. 
TABLE I 
Basic Event Names 
Symbol 	 Definition 
p personal computer of the customer 
T terminal in the bank 
A/B primary/backup server in the bank 
D local power supply service 
E backup power supply service in the bank 
F UPS for the customer's computer 
FIG. 9 shows the MC of the dynamic module, which 
involves all related parts, including shared events A, B, D, E 
12 
and F. Since this MC is affected by all three subsystems, we 
use three bits to indicate the UP or DOWN status for these 
subsystems respectively, with "0" meaning UP and "I" mean-
ing DOWN. For instance, "100" means Xl is down while 
5 both X2 and X3 are up. From FIG. 9, there are totally three 
different groups of states (000,100 and I11). Any otherresults 
(e.g. 011, 001) are impossible otherwise there should exist 
some contradictions. With such a 3-bit vector, all branches of 
the ET can be efficiently obtained, whose results are shown in 
to FIG. 10 ("0" branches are those impossible to appear). 
Following the same way, we can obtain the equivalent ET 
for the static module shown in FIG. 11. Based on FIG. 8, X3 
has no static units then is unrelated to the static module; but it 
has also been included in this ET, so that the two ET structures 
15 of dynamic and static modules are the same then we can easily 
compare their each corresponding branch to get a final ET for 
the whole system. Also, because X3 has no static units, there 
is no chance to let X3 down in this static module, so any 
branch going along "X3" should be impossible. We use "0" to 
20 represent such case in FIG. 11. The final results for the whole 
system ET are formed after combining the two ETs of FIGS. 
10 and 11, listed in table 2. Three end points are impossible to 
appear, which implies that once the third way fails to access 
the bank account (X3 occurs), there is no possibility to reach 
25 the goal by other two ways. 
TABLE 2 
30 Mark 
	
All Results 
Up/Down 	 000 	 001 	 010 011 	 100 101 	 110 	 111 
Impossible 	 X 	 X 	 X 
35 	 We need note that the MC in FIG. 9 is a little different from 
those used in previous systems, because the letter (e.g. A, B) 
of each state in a traditional MC represents that the corre-
sponding event/component is available. While in our 
example, the letter in each state represents the actual opera- 
40 tional physical situation of the corresponding event/compo-
nent. For example, in subsystem XI, the failures of D and F 
will lead to the unavailability of both A" and `B". We use 
AB-E-" to represent the state in our current MC rather than 
use "---E-" to represent such state in a traditional MC. The 
45 reason is that one unavailable event in one subsystem, may be 
still available for another subsystem due to different causes. 
Since we only construct one MC for all related dynamic units 
in this example (they are grouped into one module), it is not 
reasonable to represent such an event by simply using a sym- 
5o bol ...... 
Detailed Description of Results 
Introduction 
In this section ("Detailed Description of Results"), we 
discuss the theoretical and practical implementations of inte- 
55 grating the Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT) model into an Event 
Tree (ET) based risk assessment methodology. Dynamic 
Fault Trees (DFT) use FDEP, SPARE and PAND gates to link 
their subsystem of events as depicted in FIGS. 17,18 and 19. 
Event Trees include complex super systems of events. ET are 
60 often combined with (static) fault trees (SET) as part of a PRA 
(Probabilistic Risk Assessment) methodology. Static Fault 
Trees (SET) use, e.g., AND, OR and N/K gates to link their 
sub system of events as depicted in FIG. 12. Generally, SET 
are used to quantify branchpoints (also called pivot points) in 
65 the ET. In the present application, among other things, the 
present inventors propose to use DFT (dynamic fault trees) 
instead of SET for ET branch points. The DFT model allows, 
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among other things, the consideration of dependencies 
between events and is well suited for the analysis of com-
puter-based systems. 
Background and Assumptions 
Static Models 
Event trees and static fault trees are logically equivalent 
combinatorial models [see, e.g., Ref. B1, listed above]. This 
means that both can be represented using Boolean structure 
functions, and thus probability calculations are well defined. 
ETA and ETA, in their simplest forms, can be reduced to 
determining the probability of an event which can be 
expressed as a logical combination of Boolean indicator vari-
ables for components. Both ETA and ETA can be performed 
using cutest (see, e.g., FIG. 15 for the definition of cutest)-
based algorithms (e.g., MOCUS, Inclusion/Exclusion, Sum 
of Disjoint Products) or BDD (Binary Decision Diagrams). 
Table ofAcronyms 
Acronyms 
BDD Binary Decision Diagram 
CCF Common Cause Failures 
DFT Dynamic Fault tree 
ET Event Tree 
ETA Event Tree Analysis 
ETA Fault Tree Analysis 
IPCM Imperfect Coverage 
MPS Multi-Phase System 
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
SET Static Fault Tree 
The logical equivalence of ET and SET also means that it is 
straightforward to convert an ET to an equivalent SET and 
vice versa. Further, the use of SET to represent branching 
events in an ET is mathematically consistent. In fact, ET 
events and SET events can be arbitrarily mixed within the 
same model. 
Dynamic Models 
Dynamic fault trees involve a generalization of static mod-
els. In a static model, the structure function is combinatorial. 
This means the structure function can be expressed as a logi-
cal combination (using AND, OR and NOT) of basic events. 
The order of occurrence of the basic events is inconsequen-
tial; one only needs to know whether the event has occurred to 
determine whether the output event has occurred. The DFT, 
however, allows the output event to depend on the order in 
which events occur. The same set of events may cause system 
failure if they occur in one order and may not cause system 
failure if they occur in a different order. DFT analysis requires 
the consideration of the rates at which events occur, as well as 
whether they have occurred at all. DFT analysis is typically 
performed using Markov chains. 
The DFT and static models are not inconsistent. A static 
(combinatorial) model with exponential times to failure can 
be solved using Markov models [see Ref. B2, listed above]; 
however, dynamic models cannot be analyzed using only 
Boolean algebraic approaches (e.g., I/E, SDP, BDD). That is, 
static models can generally be solved using DFT approaches, 
while the converse is not true. However, under certain condi-
tions, Markov analysis can be combined with combinatorial 
approaches; a Markov model can be used to describe an event 
in a fault tree for example. 
Combining ET and SET 
In its simplest form, with fixed probabilities associated 
with branching events, the ET is evaluated by considering the 
paths emanating from the initialing event. If there are n 
branching points in an ET, there are paths to be considered, 
14 
each corresponding to one combination of assignments (true, 
false) to the n variables. A path then represents the logical 
AND of events that occur (where the associated variable is 
true) and a set of events that do not occur (where the associ- 
5 ated variable is false). The events in an ET are often called 
"branch points" or "pivot points." See, e.g., FIG. 20. 
Each path is labeled as to its outcome, for example system 
failure mode 1(Fl) or system failure mode 2 (F2). Some paths 
lead to successful system operation (OK) as well. More than 
I  one path may lead to the same outcome. The ET is analyzed 
by considering the logical OR of each path of all three pivot 
events (Xl, X2 and X3) occur. Failure event Fl occurs when 
X3 occurs, as long as X2 does not occur. The events in an ET 
may be generalized from single events to more complex 
15 events which are in turn logical combinations of other events. 
That is, the pivot point of an event tree can be the top event of 
a fault tree, which is in itself a logical combination (AND, 
OR) of its constituent events. Because both the ET and FT use 
logical operations, their combination is well defined. In the 
20 example ET, the events Xl, X2 and X3 may be the top events 
of fault trees. The fault trees may then represent logical func-
tions of other events. A path in the event tree is the logical 
AND of the top events of the fault trees (possibly negated) 
associated with the pivotpoints. Thus, the function associated 
25 with a leaf node in an ET can be expressed as a logic function 
of the basic events in the associated fault trees. 
Since both ET and FT represent Boolean structure func-
tions, conversion between model types and composition of 
models of different types are well defined mathematically. In 
30 fact Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) are also models in the 
same class [see, e.g., BI listed above], representing Boolean 
structure functions and thus can be similarly combined with 
ET and FT. 
Coherence 
35 	 The structure function for a fault tree is usually a coherent 
function, that is, monotonic in all variables. The practical 
implication of a coherent structure function is that a compo-
nent failure cannot cause a failed system to become opera-
tional. A coherent structure function can be adequately rep- 
4o resented by its cutsets, which are the sets of events which, 
when they all occur, cause the top event Cutsets always con-
tain events that represent component failure, never events that 
represent component non-failure. Fault trees composed of 
only AND, OR and K/M gates always result in coherent 
45 structure functions. 
Event trees explicitly contain paths that represent combi-
nations of both positive and negative events, thus it cannot be 
assumed that the structure functions associated with an ET is 
coherent. Further, even if all the FT nodes used as pivot nodes 
50 in an ET are coherent, the resulting structure function of the 
combination is not necessarily coherent. 
Non-coherent models can be problematic when using cut-
set-based analysis techniques, but present no particular diffi-
culty when using more general Boolean techniques, such as 
55 the BDD. That is, the BDD analysis approach handles non 
coherent models correctly. 
Independence vs. Shared Events 
When FT are used as ET pivot nodes, the ET becomes a 
logical function of the basic events in the FT. If the sets of 
6o basic events in each FT are mutually disjoint, then the pivot 
nodes are all mutually independent. ET analysis can then 
involve the separate analysis of each FT, using the probability 
of the top event as the probability of the pivot node. In the ET 
shown in FIG. 20, suppose that the events Xl, X2 and X3 are 
65 the top events of fault trees, and that there are no basic events 
that appear in more than one of these fault trees. Then, the 
three fault trees can be solved separately for the probabilities 
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of the events X1, X2 and X3. This set of probabilities and their 
complements, can be inserted into the ET solution. The basic 
events that contribute to the events Xl, X2 and X3 need not be 
considered in the solution of the ET. 
However, if there are basic events that are common to two 
or more of the fault trees used as pivot nodes along the path, 
then the analysis is more complicated. Instead of separate 
analysis of each fault tree, each of the fault trees along a path 
must be considered together. Consider the path (Xl, X2, X3) 
in the ET shown in FIG. 20, which leads to the outcome F3. 
Since this is the only path leading to outcome F3, it can be 
considered in isolation. The logical expression representing 
the outcome F3=X1 AND X2 AND X3. Theprobability of the 
outcome F3 is then P(F3)=P(Xl X2 X3). Since Xl, X2 and 
X3 represent the top events of fault trees (e.g., the complex 
super system of events), each can in turn be expressed as a 
logical function of its constituent events (e.g., its sub system 
of events). 
If there is more than one path leading to an outcome, then 
the logical expressions for the paths leading to the same 
outcome are connected by the logical OR operation. Internal 
events (gate outputs) may be shared between pivot node fault 
trees as well as basic events. 
For reference, Appendix A, infra, contains a detailed analy-
sis of a static event tree with static fault tree pivot nodes with 
shared events. 
Dynamic Fault Trees as Pivot Nodes 
Independent DFT as Pivot Nodes 
The use of dynamic fault trees to represent pivot nodes 
events is conceptually simple. In the case where there are no 
shared events, the independent DFT can be solved separately, 
using standard DFT analysis. A DFT for a pivot node can be 
modularized and solved via a combination of BDD and 
Markov models, and the resulting probability of the top event 
can be used in the ET analysis. The DFT model can therefore 
be used to model sequential dependencies between compo-
nents that affect the outcome of one pivot event. This analysis 
assumes that a single-phase mission is being analyzed. 
DFT Pivot Nodes with Shared Events 
If events are shared between pivot node DFT models, then 
the DFT models can no longer be solved separately. As in the 
case where the pivot FT are static, each path on the ET is 
evaluated by connecting the FT pivot node top events (possi-
bly complemented) with the logical AND operation. If mul-
tiple paths lead to the same outcome, the logical expressions 
for each path are connected by a logical OR operation. Sev-
eral issues are initially considered when DFT with shared 
events are used for pivot nodes in an ET, including: 
1. What are the implications of AND'ing or OR'ing DFT, 
particularly with shared spares or constraints? 
2. What does it mean to negate a DFT? DeMorgan's laws do 
not necessarily apply to dynamic gates or constraints. 
3. How do we extend the AND and OR operations associated 
with an ET to the Markov models used for the solution of the 
DFT? 
4. Can we avoid the generation of large Markov models by 
taking advantage of modularity? Does the Markov model 
generation or solution need to change to accommodate the 
consideration of more than one DFT on a path in the ET? 
These issues have been identified and considered while 
analyzing several example systems. Illustrative results are 
presented in Reference B4 listed above and are summarized 
herein. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the first 
two, as they relate to logical operations on DFT. The latter two 
issues relate to the Markov model solution and are addressed 
in subsequent sections. 
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Logical Operations on DFT with Shared Events 
To determine the probability of an outcome, the DFT mod-
els used to define the pivot events should be logically con-
nected with an AND operation, as is done when the pivot 
5 nodes are defined using SET. Conceptually, the AND of two 
DFT produces a third DFT, where the top nodes is an AND 
gate whose inputs are the top nodes of the DFT being com-
bined. Since the AND gate is defined for DFT and the AND 
operation is well defined within the DFT framework, this 
io combination is conceptually straightforward. 
Similarly, the combination of DFT using the OR poses no 
conceptual difficulty. 
If events are shared between the DFT being AND'ed or 
OR'ed, those events will then contribute to the outcome (e.g., 
15 the new top event) via multiple paths. The algorithms cur-
rently used to solve. DFT can accommodate such repeated 
events without difficulty. It may be beneficial to rearrange the 
events in the resulting DFT (while not changing the logical 
structure) to facilitate modularization and efficiency. Such 
20 rearrangement will not be needed for a correct solution, but 
may improve performance. 
The dynamic gates within the separate DFT, such as spare 
gates or functional dependencies, should be consistent when 
the DFT are combined. For example, if there is a spare gate 
25 that labels B as a cold spare forA in one constituent DFT, and 
a spare gate that labels A as a warm spare for B, these con-
tradictory assignments would be detected when the DFT are 
combined. GALILEO checks all DFT for validity and con-
sistency before solution. The net effect of the validity checks 
30 will be the enforcement of consistency between the different 
DFT that are used to define the pivot nodes. 
Negation of DFT 
The negation (i.e., NOT operation) is not included within 
the DFT as currently defined, and so the effects of negation 
35 are carefully considered. Negation for SET is clearly defined 
within the framework of Boolean Algebra, where DeMor-
gan's laws relate the negation of an operation with the nega-
tion of the inputs. DeMorgan's laws do not apply directly to 
DFT. 
40 	 There are at least three different constructs to be considered 
with respect to negation. First, the interpretation of the nega-
tion of dynamic gates (e.g., spare gates and PAND) must be 
specified. Second, the negation operation when applied to 
constraints (such as, e.g., FDEP) must be defined. Third, the 
45 interpretation of negation to replicated basic events must also 
be considered. These definitions must be clearly and com-
pletely specified so as to be consistently applicable to all valid 
DFT. 
In our example analyses [see Ref. B4 listed above] some 
5o rules for negation have been suggested. These suggestions 
will be further discussed herein. From initial results, we can 
extend negation to the DFT gates and constraint. 
Negating DFT Gates 
First, consider the spare gate. A spare gate defines several 
55 parameters to the model: the failure rate of the active compo-
nent, the failure rate of the spare component, the order in 
which spares are used, the implications of sharing pools of 
spares, and the logical status of the spare set. This latter 
aspect, the logical output of the spare gate, is defined to be 
60 true when the primary and all of its spares have been used or 
have failed. It is to this logical aspect that the negation applies, 
and the other aspects remain unchanged. That is, the negation 
of a spare gate is the negation of the logical output of the gate. 
The other implications of the gate remain unchanged. 
65 The negation of the PAND gate output can be analyzed 
using DeMorgan's law. A PAND gate with 2 inputs, A and B 
is true when both A and B have occurred and A occurred 
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before B. The negation of the PAND can then be interpreted to 
mean that A did not occur, or B did not occur, or A occurred 
after B. The only ambiguity occurs when A and B occur 
simultaneously, and depends on the interpretation of the P 
AND of simultaneous events. If the PAND is true for simul-
taneous events, then the negation of PAND is not. 
Negating DFT Constraints 
Constraints in the DFT language refer to constructs that 
have no logical output but which affect events in the free. 
Currently defined constraints include the FDEP (functional 
dependency constraint) (see, e.g., FIG. 17), SEQ (Sequence 
Enforcing constraint) and CCG (common-cause group) (see, 
e.g., FIG. 19). FDEP propagates failures and is used when 
some components depend on others for their continued opera-
tion. SEQ enforces sequential ordering of events. CCG 
defines common cause groups, basic events that may be sub-
ject to common mode failures. 
None of the constraints has a logical output, so negation is 
inconsequential. The effect of a constraint is the same before 
and after negation. 
Non-Coherence 
Including negation in a DFT model may result in a DFT 
that is no longer coherent. In fact, including negation in a SET 
may also result in a model that is not coherent. Coherence 
impacts many facets of the solution of a DFT and must be 
considered carefully. The impact of non-coherence on BDD-
based analysis appears to be less than the impact on BDD-
based approaches [see Ref. B5 listed above]. A non-coherent 
DFT can result in a vast increase in the number of states 
needed in a Markov model. At this point, there are some 
complexities in identifying conditions under which a non-
coherent model results from negation of a DFT, although 
there are situations in which we can be sure that a coherent 
model results. 
Markov Chain Solution of ET with DFT Pivot Nodes 
Initial results indicate that the use of DFT to define pivot 
nodes in static ET can be well defined and logically consis-
tent. In this section, we consider issues related to the Markov 
chain analysis of DFT within the ET framework. 
No Shared Events 
When there are no shared events between any DFT being 
used as pivot nodes, each DFT can be solved separately as an 
independent Markov model. No changes to the ET or DFT 
established methodologies are needed. Non-coherence is not 
a problem in this case, since the probability of a negated DFT 
can be easily calculated from the probability of occurrence of 
the DFT top event. That is, negation can be performed in 
probability rather than in event space. 
Shared Events 
When events are shared between DFT being used as pivot 
nodes in an ET, the DFT are combined using logical opera-
tions (AND, OR and NOT) to produce a single DFT for each 
outcome. First, consider the case where there are only two 
possible outcomes, success and failure. The resulting DFT 
then represents one of the two outcomes (the other being the 
negation of the DFT). The DFT for the outcome can be solved 
using a combination of BDD and Markov model solutions, 
according to the standard modular approach for DFT. The 
standard approach should be expanded to support the NOT 
operation, with the careful consideration of non-coherence. 
In the more general case, multiple outcomes are considered 
and multiple DFT models (one for each outcome) will be 
produced. These DFT will necessarily share events and their 
combined solution must be produced. The combined solution 
approach is described via example in Reference B4 listed 
above. 
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The approach in the preferred embodiments to the solution 
of ET with DFT pivot nodes is to construct a single Markov 
model whose single solution will simultaneously produce the 
probability of occurrence for each outcome. Generally, when 
5 using a Markov chain to solve a reliability model, each state 
in the model is labeled as to whether it represents a system 
configuration that is operational or failed. To achieve analysis 
of several outcomes represented by an event tree, we expand 
this label to be a vector of labels, one for each outcome. That 
io is, each state is labeled as to whether or not each outcome is 
achieved. This approach is applied to an example in Refer-
ence B4 listed above and is not dissimilar to our approach to 
phased mission analysis using Markov models. 
The proposed approach to solving a ET/DFT model 
15 requires some simple changes to our Markov chain genera-
tion approach. The models presented in Reference B4 listed 
above were solved manually (general algorithms did not yet 
exist). A fully developed approach may be influenced, e.g., 
experiences with phased mission analysis. 
20 Modular Solution 
An important feature of the DFT solution approach is the 
automatic decomposition of the DFT into independent mod-
ules which can be solved separately. The modules can be 
solved using different solution techniques, as appropriate. 
25 Modularization can result in tremendous improvements in 
efficiency and accuracy, and is described in Reference B3 
listed above. Modularization is well defined for single phase 
DFT, and has recently been extended to multi-phase systems 
as well [see Reference B6 listed above], but had not previ- 
30 ously been explored within the context of ETA. 
Detecting modules in a DFT that represents a multi-phase 
system or that results from an ET-DFT model is considerably 
more difficult than detecting modules in a standard single-
phase DFT. These latter two DFT models (referred to herein 
35 as a compound DFT) are composed of DFT sub-models using 
many of the same basic events. The modularization process 
for compound DFT generally involves detecting modules in 
each constituent DFT (e.g., the separate DFT for each phase 
or ET outcome) and then combining the modules together 
4o again to form modularized compound DFT. 
Although the approach to modularizing phased mission 
DFT is not directly applicable to ET-DFT models, the 
approaches will likely be similar. Appendix B contains an 
example analysis that illustrates a basic approach of modular 
45 solution. This approach has been implemented manually and 
can be further developed based on this disclosure. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Initial results show that the integration of DFT into static 
ETA is not only feasible, it could greatly extend the modeling 
50 capability of the ET. A number of notable issues have been 
discussed, including the logical definition and interpretation 
Of the Model, model solution, and modularization. A short 
summary of some of the findings is given below: 
ET-DFT integration (from a modeling perspective) is rela-
55 tively straight forward when the pivot node DFT are indepen-
dent (i.e., do not share events). 
Sharing events across pivot nodes requires the construction 
and solution of a compound-DFT, which is the logical com-
bination of several DFT models for different outcomes. 
60 Logical combinations of DFT appear to be mathematically 
consistent with the rules of Boolean algebra. 
ET-DFT construction may result in non-coherent models 
(even if all the constituent DFT models are coherent) and care 
must be exercised in their analysis. 
65 Algorithms for generation of Markov models for the analy-
sis compound-DFT can be further developed based on those 
algorithms used for analysis of DFT. 
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Modularization algorithms can be further developed and 	
-continued 
	
can provide potential improvements in efficiency and accu- 	
F(outcome,) = X1 - X2. X3 	 (13) 
racy. 
=[A +BC][D+ BE] [F.B+F-E]  
APPENDIX 	 5 	 =A D.F.B+A-D-F-E+D-F-B-C-E 
An Example ET with Static FT Pivot Nodes 	 F(outcome8) = X1 X2. X3 	 (14) 
_ [A + BC][D + BE][F + BE] 
This appendix shows an illustrative detailed analysis of the = A . D . F + D - F. B - C + A - B - E + B - C. E 
event tree shown in FIG. 20 of the report. It shows, by way of 10 
the example, the analysis process used for ETA. For the sake 
of illustration, both the IE (Inclusion/Exclusion) (see, e.g., Assuming, e.g., the failure probability of each outcome is 
FIG. 14) and BDD (Binary Decision Diagram) (see, e.g., FIG. fixed value of 0.2, then the corresponding success probability 
16) approaches are illustrated for different parts of the model. is 0.8. In the following paragraphs, two different approaches 
Here is a simple hypothetical example of ET, the fault tree 15 will be used to show the whole evaluation process. One is 
structures of whose three pivot events are shown in FIG. 20 of Inclusion Exclusion Expansion (IE) (see, e.g., FIG. 14); the 
the main report, reproduced here for the sake of clarity. FIG. 
other is Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) (see, e.g., FIG. 16). 21 shows the fault tree nodes associated with the pivot nodes 
X1, X2 and X3. Using IE (Inclusion/Exclusion) 
According to Boolean algebra, the logic functions of the 20 
top events associated to three fault trees are as follows. 
Pr{outcome s }= X1 -  X 2. X3 	 (15) 
Xl A+BC 
X2=D+BE 
X3=F+BE 
X1 A+BC=A-(W+C)=A-B+A-C 
X2 D+BE D-(B+E)=D-B+DE 
F(outcomei) = X 1- X2. X3 
= [A-B+A-C][D-B+D-El[F-B+F E] 
F(outcomez ) = X 1- X2. X3 
_ [A - B + A - C][D - B + D - El [F + BE] 
=A - D - F - B+A D F GE 
F(outcome3 ) = X1 X 2. X 3 
=[A B+A-C][D+ BE] [F.B+F.E] 
=A-D-F-B+A-D-F-GE 
F(outcome4) = X1 X 2. X 3 
=[A B+A C][D+BE][F+BE] 
=A-D-F-B+A-D-F-C+A-B-GE 
F(outcome 5 ) = X 1 - X2.  X3 
_ [A + BC][D - B + D - E] [F - B + F - E] 
=A-D.F.B+A-D-F-E+D-F-B-GE 
F(outcome6) = X 1- X2. X3 
_ [A + BC][D - B + D - E] [F + BE] 
=A-D-F-B+A-D-F-E+D-F-B-C-E 
(1) =PrIA.D.F.B+A D.F.C.El 
= PrIA-D-F-B]+PrIA-D-F-C-E]- 
(2) 25 	 PrIA-D-F-B -C-E] 
(3) _ (0.8)4 + (0.8)5 — (0.8) 6 
= 0.475136 
(4) 30 
	 Pr{outcomez ] = PrIX1 - X2. X31 	 (16) 
=PrIA D F B+A - D - F - C - E] 
(5) =PrIA D F B]+PrIAD Fc E]- 
PrIA.D.F.B .C.E] 
_ (0.8)3 .(0.2) +(0.8)4  (0.2) — (0.8) 5 .(0.2) 
= 0.118784 
Pr{outcome3 ] = PrIXI - X2. X31 	 (17) 
=PrIA D F B+A - D - F - C - E] 
(7) 
40 	
=PrIA D F B]+PrIA-D-F-C-E]- 
PrIA.D.F.B .C.E] 
_ (0.8)3 .(0.2) +(0.8)4  (0.2) — (0.8) 5 .(0.2) 
= 0.118784 
(8) 45 	
Pr{outcome¢] = PrIXI - X2. X31 	 (18) 
=PrIA D F B+A-D-F-C+A-B-C-E] 
=PrIA D F B]+PrIA D - F C]+ 
(9) 50 
	 PrIA B C E] — PrIA D.F B-C]- 
PrIA.D.F.B.C.E] 
_ (0.8)2 . (0.2)2 x3 — (0.8) 3 . (0.2)2 — 
(10) (0.8)2 .(0.2)4 
55 	 = 0.055296 
Pr{outcomes ] = PrIX 1 - X2. X31 	 (19) 
(11) =PrIA D F B+A - D - F - E+D - F B - C - E] 
=PrIA D F B]+PrIA - D F E]+ 
60 	
PrID F B C E] — PrIA D F - B E]— 
PrIA D F E B - C] 
(12) _ (0.8)3 .(0.2) x 2 + (0.8)3 .(0.2)2 — 
(0.8)4 .(0.2) — (0.8) 3 .(0.2)3 
65 
= 0.139264 
X3 F+BE=F(B+E FB+FE 	 (6 
35 
Therefore, each of the eight outcomes of the all paths are 
obtained by ANDING all pivot events along the path. The 
logical functions of these outcomes are listed below. 
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-continued 	 combination of the basic events (success or failure) repre- 
	
Pr{outcome s} = Pr{X1 - X2. X31 	 (20) 	 sentedby the path. For example, the probability calculation of 
=Pr{A D.F.B+A D.F.E+D-F-B-C-E} 	
outcome, is shown in equation (23). 
	
Pr{outcome, I = Pr{ paths 1 + Pr{ pathz l 	 (23) 
=Pr{A-D-F.BI+Pr{A D.F.B C. El 
= (0.8)4 + (0.8)5 (0.2) 
10 
= 0.475136 
This result is the same as that obtained in equation (15). It is 
15 obvious that the calculation process of BDD-based approach 
is much clearer and conciser than IE-based approach. Follow-
ing similar process, all other outcomes can be quantified. 
Table Al lists all the results. 
20 	 TABLE Al 
Calculation results of all outcomes of ET 
Probability of 
Logic each outcome 
25 	 Case function for Logic function for Using Using 
# each path each outcome IE BDD 
1 X1-X2-X3 A D F B+ 0.475136 0.475136 
A D F C - E 
2 X1 X2 X3  A D F B+ 0.118784 0.118784 
30 A D F C - E 
3 X1 X2 X3 A D F B+ 0.118784 0.118784 
A D F C - F 
4 X1 X2 X3  A D F B+ 0.055296 0.055296 
A D F C+ 
A B C E 
35 	 5 XI X2 30 A D F B+ 0.139264 0.139264 
A D F F+ 
D F B C - F 
6 X1 X2 X3 A D F B+ 0.034816 0.034816 
A D F F+ 
D F B C - E 
=Pr{A-D-F-BI+Pr{A-D-F-EI+ 
Pr{D.F.B.C.EI—Pr{A D.F.B.EI-
Pr{A-D-F.E.B.Q 
= (0.8)2 .(0.2)2 x 2 + (0.8)2 -(0.2) 3 — 
(0.8)3 .(0.2)3 — (0.8)2 .(0.2)4 
= 0.034816 
Pr{outcome7l = Pr{X1 - X2. X31 	 (21) 
=Pr{A D.F.B+A D.F.E+D.F.B.C.El 
=Pr{A D - F BI+Pr{A - D F El+ 
Pr{D F.B C.El — Pr{A D F.B-El- 
Pr{A D - F.B - C.El 
= (0.8)2 .(0.2)2 x 2 + (0.8)2 -(0.2) 3 — 
(0.8)3 .(0.2)3 — (0.8)2 .(0.2)4 
= 0.034816 
Pr{outcome 8 l = Pr{X 1 - X2.  X31 	 (22) 
=Pr{A D F+D - F - B - C+A - B E+B - C - El 
=Pr{A D FI+Pr{D - F - B CI+ 
Pr{A B El+Pr{B-C-El- 
Pr{A D F  Cl - Pr{A D F BEl -  
Pr{A D F B C - El - Pr{A D F B - C El- 
Pr{D F B C El - Pr{A - B C.El+ 
Pr{A D F B C Elx4- 
Pr{ADFBCEl 
= (0.2)3 x 3 + (0.2)4 — (0.2) 5 x 3 — 
(0.2) 6  x 2 — (0.2) 4 
 + (0.2) 6  x 4 — 
(0.2) 6 
= 0.023104 
Using BDD (Binary Decision Diagram) 	 40 7 	 X1-X2-X3 	 A - D - F - B+ 	 0.034816 	 0.034816 A - D - F - F + 
A major idea of BDD-based approach is to analyze the D - F - B - C - F 
BDD of each outcome, which is obtained by combining BDD 8 	 XI-X2-X3 	 A - D - F + D - 	 0.023104 	 0.023104 
structures with dual BDD (DBDD) structures of all involved F-B-C+A- B . E + B - C - E 
pivot events along a certain path in ET. The DBDD is con- 
verted from associated BDD via De Morgan's Laws. FIG. 22 45 sum 	 1 	 1 
shows all BDD and DBDD structures of Xl, X2 and X3. In 
this example, the variable (basic event) order is supposed to 
be A<D<F<B<C<E. APPENDIX B 
In FIG. 22, each node represents a basic event from the 50 
fault tree and has two paths, including a 1 branch and a 0 
branch which indicate the failure occurrence and non-occur- Applying Modularization in Combining Dynamic 
rence of the basic event respectively. Paths through the BDD Fault Trees and Event Trees 
leading to terminal node 1 specify the conditions for the fault 
tree top event to occur (positive), while paths through DBDD 55 In combining dynamic fault trees (DFT) and event trees 
leading to terminal node 1 represent the top event non-occur- (ET), we consider the case that the branch points of an ET are 
rence (negative). represented by DFT, and that there are some shared events 
In order to obtain the BDD of all outcomes in ET, different among different branch points. In order to get all possible end 
combinations of these BDD and DBDD are required. For points or outcomes of the ET, we need first analyze all branch 
example, the BDD structure of outcome, XT-MIX -3 can be 60 points along all paths, which can be resolved through Markov 
obtained by ANDING DBDD structures of Xl, X2 and X3. Chain (MC) based method. Since one major disadvantage of 
FIG. 23 illustrates the combination process. MC is the state-space explosion problem, we must avoid this 
Due to BDD characteristic that all binary branching paths problem. In our current work, we use modularization [see, 
in the diagram are mutually exclusive, the probability of e.g., Refs. Cl, C2 and C3], an efficient methodology to solve 
system failure can be obtained by simply summing the prob- 65 the problem, which is illustrated via a modified example 
ability of each disjoint path leading to a terminal node 1. The based on a real example from NASA's space shuttle proba- 
probability of each disjoint path is the probability of the bilistic risk assessment notebook. 
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Introduction 
For a dynamic system, in which both the combinatorial 
relationships and the failure sequences, functional dependen-
cies, and stand-by spares need take into account: MC 
(Markov Chain) has been used to efficiently keep track of the 
dynamic history of the system in terms of states and finally 
solve the whole system [see Ref. C4 listed above]. For 
example, FIG. 24 gives the MC for a standby system. The 
system has three components, including a primary unit being 
operational, a backup unit being standby and a switch used to 
switch from the primary unit to the backup one if the primary 
one fails. State 1, 2, 3 and represent all different system status, 
with state 1 representing the original status that all three 
components are in good condition, state 2 and 3 representing 
the intermediate, status that the primary unit fails first and the 
switch fails first, respectively, and state representing the sys-
tem failure status. 
However, a major problem of any state-based Modeling 
such as MC is the state space explosion problem, which 
negatively affects both the MC constructing time and solving 
time. On the other side, many systems especially safety-
critical systems inevitably contain numerous states. The two 
facts tell us it is necessary to find a new way or use an existing 
approach to avoid the state space explosion problem. Fortu-
nately, modularity, an important concept that has been widely 
used in diverse fields has also efficiently been adopted in fault 
tree analysis [see Ref. C2 listed above]. 
We introduce previous idea of modularity for a single FT 
below. Then, we extend the method to multiple FT in ET 
analysis in the next section. Then, in the next section, we give 
an example to illustrate the benefit brought by this method-
ology. A conclusion is then drawn in the next section. 
An Overview of Modularization 
Modularity can be intuitively regarded as subdivision of a 
complex object into simpler and smaller objects. In this sec-
tion, we will see how to apply this concept to a single static or 
dynamic fault tree. 
Rauzy's Algorithm 
An original algorithm to find the modules in fault trees was 
first proposed byYves Dutuit andAntoine Rauzy [see Ref. C2 
listed above], in which a Depth-First Left-Most traversal is 
performed. During the traversal, each node including gate and 
basic event is marked with the visiting orders in terms of a 
vector {first order, second order}. A node is an independent 
module if and only if its descendents are visited between 
first order and second—Order, the detail is illustrated in Ref-
erence C6 listed above. After this procedure, a large fault tree 
is decomposed into multiple independent smaller modules 
from up to down. Each module will be easily solved sepa-
rately from bottom to top then to form the top event or system 
unreliability/reliability. This idea is shown by FIG. 25. In 
FIG. 25, there are one top event r, seven basic events from to 
e, to e, and six gates from g, to g 6 . According to Rauzy's 
algorithm, the five independent modules are r, g l , g„ gs and 
g6, while 92 and 93  are not modules because they are depen-
dent on shared part g s . 
DIFtree Uses Modularization to Combine SET and DFT 
While the limitation of Rauzy's algorithm is that it only 
concentrates on static fault trees without considering 
dynamic systems, more information is needed to develop an 
algorithm for combining dynamic fault trees and event trees. 
DIFtree (Dynamic Innovative Fault Tree), a software pack-
age for the analysis of dynamic fault tree models, is fully 
described in Reference C5 listed above, in which a dynamic 
subtree is treated as an indecomposable module by identify-
ing whether the top gate of the subtree is a dynamic one. This 
is illustrated in FIG. 26. Finally, there are 3 modules: G o, G, 
24 
and G2 . While G3 is ruled out the module list because it is 
embedded in the dynamic module G, which can not be 
decomposed any more. Thus, a general dynamic fault tree, 
either only including dynamic parts or including both 
5 dynamic and static parts, can be modularized using DIFtree in 
addition to Rauzy's algorithm. 
Applying Modularization to Event Tree Analysis 
In order to apply modularity method in the ET to get all 
10 
possible end points, we analyze each point passing along a 
path. Since there exist some shared events across different 
branchpoints or exist dependencies among those points along 
one path, we cannot analyze each point independently. In this 
section, we introduce some new features of an ET then the 
15 way to apply modularization in ET analysis. 
Modularization Concepts for Event Trees 
Branchpoint The branch points of an ET in this paper are 
not limited to basic events any longer, which are composed of 
some subsystems represented by FT. 
20 Premodule A module which is identified within one 
single branch point or subsystem is called a premodule, which 
is used to form module across several branch points. 
Branch module A branch module is created by incorpo-
rating all related premodules from all single branch points. 
25 Direct Modularization on Branch Points 
Reference is made to FIG. 27. According to the concepts 
introduced above, four premodules are identified as M xi {A, 
B}, Mxz {C, D}, Myi {F} and Myz {B, E}. They are then used 
to form the branch modules by integrating all related premod- 
30 
ules. The new branch modules are obtained as M i {A, B, E} 
and MAC, D, F}. In combining DFT and ET, all branch 
modules will be solved independently using BDD or MC 
based method, so that we can ultimately get all end points of 
35 the ET. 
Indirect Modularization for Markov Models 
The consequence of the direct modularization for different 
branch points or the FT is that it makes the following resolv-
ing process much simpler due to the indirect modularization 
40 of MC. On one side, we avoid constructing a separate MC for 
each branch point that would be a tedious and unreasonable 
work due to the dependencies caused by shared events; on the 
other side, we also avoid constructing a single MC for the 
whole system that would be terrible and not impractical due to 
45 the state-space explosion problem. The obvious effect of state 
space saving will be illustrated by an example later. 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
50 	 APU Example Description 
As an example application of the modularization approach, 
we consider the auxiliary power unit system (APU) of space 
shuttle [see Ref. C7 listed above]. The Orbiter is equipped 
55 with three hydraulic systems to supply redundant power to all 
hydraulically driven components. Any of three systems is 
divided into three subsystems: 1) hydraulic power generation 
subsystem (HPGS), 2) water spray boiler (WSB), and 3) 
auxiliary power unit (APU). Each is required to maintain 
6o nominal hydraulic system performance. The function of the 
APU model is to serve as an integrating platform for the 
hydraulic and water boiler subsystems to assess the risk of 
losing hydraulic power on the space shuttle orbiter. This 
model is constructed such that the top event (loss of hydraulic 
65 power) can be integrated into other risk models to assess the 
risk of catastrophic failure during orbiter operation. FIG. 28 is 
the ET structure of the hydraulic system which indicates that 
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loss of a single hydraulic system is not catastrophic, however, 
the loss of two or more hydraulic systems will result in a loss 
of crew and/or vehicle. 
Here, each branch point of the ET is a relatively compli-
cated single hydraulic system, which is represented by a FT 
structure. For simplicity, the FT structures based on a real 
example are modified to be used for our analysis, shown in 
FIG. 29(a)-29(e). 
Modularization 
Based on the FT structure in Figure B6, we see that there is 
a shared event as a spare across all three systems, and there 
also exist dependency relationships due to common causes X, 
Y and Z. After applying modularization methodology, we get 
three premodules from each single hydraulic system and then 
form three branch modules, M 1 JAl , Az, A31  A, X}, M2 113 1 ; 
Bz , 13 31 Y} and M3 {C 1 , Cz, C31  Z}. Thus the size ofthe MC for 
branch modules efficiently decreases. FIG. 30(A) only list a 
small part of the MC before modularization, which theoreti-
cally contains 2", namely 2 13 states in total. See also FIG. 
30(B). Table BI makes a brief comparison before and after 
this process. The efficiency is greatly improved. 
TABLE BI 
A comparison of MC size 
Before 	 After modularization 
modularization 	 module 1 	 module 2 	 module 3 
# of states 	 8192 	 32 	 16 	 16 
Conclusions from the APU Example of 
Modularization 
Most safety critical systems are composed of many sub-
systems, with each containing hundreds even thousands of 
components. These components may have direct or indirect 
relationships such as sharing with a commonpower supply, or 
sharing with a common spare component for different units 
across several subsystems. Therefore, modularity is very 
important during the ET analysis process, especially helpful 
when we combine DFT and ET (e.g., both reducing the over-
head to construct MC then solve it and reducing the chance to 
create the errors). In this application, the modified APU 
example efficiently proved the improvement on saving state 
space by modularizing. It should be appreciated that this is 
only an illustrative an non-limiting two level simplified 
example. In reality, a real system with multi-level structure 
should benefit from this process much more. 
Additional Examples 
For illustrative purposes, FIG. 31 shows an illustrative and 
non-limiting schematic diagram that represents a method for 
calculating the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of a 
complex super system (an event tree ET 115) consisting of the 
internal nodes (IN 113) xl and x2 (in circles), (which are 
sometimes referred to as event nodes EN 111), the leaf nodes 
LN110, and their connecting paths (112). The nodes xl and 
x2 are also top events (TE 114) of static and dynamic sub-
systems, static and dynamic to be defined momentarily. 
Subsystem 1 consists of events A" and `B" joint by a 
PAND gate, and its top (failure) event is the event tree (ET 
115) node xt Subsystem 2 consists of the events "C" and "D" 
joined by a hot spare gate, and its top (failure) event is event 
tree node (ET 115) x2. In this case, both subsystems are 
26 
dynamic, since both gates are dynamic. We can, however, 
envision the gate of subsystem 1 to be an AND gate. In that 
case, subsystem 1 would be static, and subsystem 2 would be 
dynamic. Static gates include AND, OR and N/K. Dynamic 
5 gates include FDEP, SP and PAND. Likewise, if we assume 
that the gate of subsystem 2 is also dynamic, then the event 
tree would have two static subsystems. If the gate(s) connect-
ing the events of the subsystem are all static, the subsystem is 
referred to as a Static Fault Tree (SET). If any of the sub- 
l0 
system's gates are dynamic, it is referred to as a Dynamic 
Fault Tree (DFT). 
The internal nodes (IN113) represent mitigating or aggra-
vating events in the complex super system, and the leaf nodes 
15 (LN110) represent system failure, non failure or non-occur-
ring conditions 
The paths of the ET 115 are traversed as follows: 
1) If node xl is true, then the path 112c labeled X1 (without 
bar) is taken and the leaf node (LN 110c) at F2 is reached. This 
20 path represents a system failure. 
2) If node xl is false and node x2 is true, then the path 
comprised of Xl (bar), X2 (without bar) and leaf node 
(LN110b) at Fl is taken. This path also represents a system 
failure 
25 	 3) If node xl is false and node x2 is false, then the path 
comprised of Xl (bar) X2 (bar) and leaf node (LN110a) at 
OK is taken. This path represents a non-system failure. 
In the case where two or more subsystems are SFTs with no 
events in common (e.g., it in our tree both subsystems 1 and 
30 2 were static, and events A", `B", "C" and "D" were distinct 
events), then the probability of the paths (112a, 112b, 
112c) corresponding to the top events (TE 114) of the SET 
subsystems along the event tree (ET 115) would be calcu- 
35 lated using inclusion/exclusion analysis or Binary Decision 
Diagram analysis (BDD). The same type of analysis would be 
used in the case of SFTs even if events are in common, such 
as (A—C or D) or (B —C or D). 
In the case where two or more subsystems are DFTs with 
40 no events in common (e.g., if, in our tree both subsystems 1 
and 2 were static, and events A", `B", "C" and "D" were 
distinct events), then the probability of the paths (112a, 112b, 
112c) corresponding to the top events (TE 114) of the DFT 
subsystems along the event tree (ET 115) would be calcu- 
45 lated using a combination of BDD and Markov Chain analy-
sis. 
The case where two or more subsystems are DFTs with 
events in common (e.g., if in our example both subsystems 
were dynamic, and (A—C or D) or (B or D), the probability of 
50 the path represented by such DFTs would be calculated by 
ANDing the DFTs. to produce a third DFT, and, after a 
process of modularization, again applying a combination of 
BDD and Markov chain analysis. 
Preferred Systems 
55 The preferred embodiments of the invention can be imple-
mented on one or more computer(s) and/or one or more 
network of computer(s), such as a local area network (LAN), 
a wide area network (WAN), the Internet and/or another net-
work. In various embodiments, one or more server(s), 
60 client computer(s), application computer(s) and/or other 
computer(s) can be utilized to implement one or more aspect 
of the invention. Illustrative computers can include, e.g.: a 
central processing unit; memory (e.g., RAM, etc.); digital 
data storage (e.g., hard drives, etc.); input/output ports (e.g., 
65 parallel and/or serial ports, etc.); data entry devices (e.g., key 
boards, etc.); etc. Client computers may contain, in some 
embodiments, browser software for interacting with the serv- 
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er(s), such as, for example, using hypertext transfer protocol 	 ments, modifications, omissions, combinations (e.g., of 
(HTTP) to make requests of the server(s) via the Internet or 	 aspects across various embodiments), adaptations and/or 
the like. 	 alterations as would be appreciated by those in the art based 
In some preferred embodiments, the system utilizes rela- 	 on the present disclosure. The limitations in the claims are to 
tional databases, such as, e.g., employing a relational data-  5 be interpreted broadly based on the language employed in the 
base management system (RDBMS) program to create, 	 claims and not limited to examples described in the present 
update and/or administer a relational database. The RDBMS 	 specification or during the prosecution of the application, 
may take Structured Query Language (SQL) statements 	 which examples are to be construed as non-exclusive. For 
entered by a user or contained in an application program and 	 example, in the present disclosure, the term "preferably" is 
create, updates and/or provides access to database(s). Some io non-exclusive and means "preferably, but not limited to." In 
illustrative RDBMS's include ORACLE'S database product 	 this disclosure and during the prosecution of this application, 
line and IBM's DB2 product line. In some illustrative 	 means-plus-function or step-plus-function limitations will 
embodiments, one or more client computer can be provided; 	 only be employed where for a specific claim limitation all of 
which can include separate client systems, LAN-based sys- 	 the following conditions are present in that limitation: a) 
tems, and/or various other client systems. The client comput-  15 "means for" or "step for" is expressly recited; b) a corre- 
er(s) can include an appropriate operating system, such as, for 	 sponding function is expressly recited; and c) structure, mate- 
example, WINDOWS NT or another system. In preferred 	 rial or acts that support that structure are not recited. In this 
embodiments, the system is adapted to provide an object 	 disclosure and during the prosecution of this application, the 
based graphical user interface (GUI). 	 terminology "present invention" or "invention" may be used 
In some preferred embodiments, the system provides a 20 as a reference to one or more aspect within the present dis- 
multi-user client server system, such as, e.g., in the embodi- 	 closure. The language present invention or invention should 
ment shown in FIG. 32(A). In some preferred embodiments, 	 not be improperly interpreted as an identification of critical- 
users are provided with a graphical user interface that is 	 ity, should not be improperly interpreted as applying across 
presented to the users via client computers. In some embodi- 	 all aspects or embodiments (i.e., it should be understood that 
ments, the graphical user interface enables the importing 25 the present invention has a number of aspects and embodi- 
and/or exporting of data or information. 	 ments), and should not be improperly interpreted as limiting 
FIG. 32(B) shows an illustrative computer 320 that can be 	 the scope of the application or claims. In this disclosure and 
used to implement computerized process steps in some 	 during the prosecution of this application, the terminology 
embodiments of the invention. In some embodiments, the 	 "embodiment" can be used to describe any aspect, feature, 
computer 320 includes a central processing unit (CPU) 322, 30 process or step, any combination thereof, and/or any portion 
which can communicate with a set of input/output (I/O) 	 thereof, etc. In some examples, various embodiments may 
device(s) 324 over a bus 326. The I/O devices 324 can 	 include overlapping features. In this disclosure, the following 
include, for example, a keyboard, mouse, video monitor, 	 abbreviated terminology may be employed: "e.g." which 
printer, and/or other devices. 	 means "for example." 
The CPU 322 can communicate with a computer readable 35 What is claimed is: 
medium (e.g., conventional volatile or non-volatile data stor- 	 1. A method for calculating Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
age devices) 328 (hereafter "memory 328") over the bus 326. 	 (PRA) of a complex super system through the use of an event 
The interaction between a CPU 322, I/O devices 324, a bus 	 tree (ET) having one or more individual paths and whose 
326, and a memory 328 can be like that known in the art. 	 event nodes are top events of Static Fault Trees (SFT) and 
Memory 328 can include, in some examples, calendar data, 4o Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT), said method comprising: 
event data and/or other data 330. The memory 328 can also 	 calculating the probability of various paths of said event 
store software 338. The software 338 can include a number of 	 tree (ET) by calculating the probability of various event 
modules 340 for implementing the steps of processes. Con- 	 nodes of the individual paths of said event tree (ET); 
ventional programming techniques may be used to imple- 	 wherein 
ment these modules. Memory 328 can also store the above 45 	 said event tree (ET) is a binary tree; 
and/or other data file(s). 	 said event nodes comprise: 
In some embodiments, the various methods described 
	
internal nodes, which represent mitigating or aggravat- 
herein may be implemented via a computer program product 	 ing events in said complex super system, and 
for use with a computer system. This implementation may, for 	 leaf nodes, which represent failure of said complex 
example, include a series of computer instructions fixed on a 50 	 super system, non-failure of said complex super sys- 
computer readable medium (e.g., a diskette, a CD-ROM, 	 tem, or non-occurring conditions in said complex 
ROM or the like) or transmittable to a computer system via 	 super system; 
and interface device, such as a modem or the like. The 	 a Static Fault Tree (SFT) is a structured graph of an SFT sub 
medium may be substantially tangible (e.g., communication 	 system of events of said complex super system; 
lines) and/or substantially intangible (e.g., wireless media 55 	 said Static Fault Trees (SFT) top events represent a failure 
using microwave, light, infrared, etc.). The computer instruc- 	 in a component corresponding to an event of said com- 
tions canbe written invarious programming languages and/or 	 plex super system, and 
can be stored in memory device(s), such as semiconductor 	 said Static Fault Trees (SFT) comprise one or more SFT 
devices (e.g., chips or circuits), magnetic devices, optical 	 child events, wherein said SFT child events are sub 
devices and/or other memory devices. In the various embodi-  60 	 events of said complex super system and wherein said 
ments, the transmission may use any appropriate communi- 	 one or more SFT child events are connected by ordinary 
cations technology. 	 Boolean AND, OR and/or N/K gates; 
Broad Scope of the Invention 	 a Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT) is a structured graph of a DFT 
While illustrative embodiments of the invention have been 	 sub system of events of said complex super system, 
described herein, the present invention is not limited to the 65 	 said Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) top events represent a 
various preferred embodiments described herein, but 	 failure in a component corresponding to an event of said 
includes any and all embodiments having equivalent ele- 	 complex super system, and 
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said Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) comprise one or more 
DFT child events, wherein said DFT child events are sub 
events of said complex super system and wherein said 
one or more DFT child events are connected by gates 
comprising: 5 
Functional Dependency Gates (FDEP gates), wherein 
said FDEP gates model situations where one compo- 
nent's correct operation is dependent upon the correct 
operation of some other component, 
Spare Gates (SP gates), wherein said SP gates model io 
cold, warm and hot pooled spares, and 
Priority AND (PAND) gates wherein said PAND gates 
model ordered ANDing of events; 
calculation of the probability of one or more pivot nodes of 
said complex super system that are top events of SFTs 15 
which have no sub events of said complex super system 
in common comprises inclusion/exclusion probability 
analysis or Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) analysis; 
and 
calculation of the probability of two or more pivot nodes of 20 
said complex super system that are top events of SFTs 
which have shared sub events of said complex super 
system comprises ANDING said SET pivot nodes along 
the path and applying inclusion/exclusion probability 
analysis or BDD analysis. 	 25 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the calculation of the 
probability of one or more pivot nodes of said complex super 
system are top events of DFTS that have no shared sub events 
of said complex super system is calculated via modulariza-
tion using a combination of BDD and Markov Chain (MC) 30 
analysis. 
3. The method of claim 2, wherein in the calculation of the 
probability of two or more pivot nodes of said complex super 
system are top events of DFTs that have shared sub events of 
said complex super system is produced by ANDing the DFTs 35 
to produce a third DFT. 
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the probability of said 
third DFT is calculated using a combination of BDD and 
Markov Chain (MC) analysis.  
30 
5. The method of claim 3, wherein for a DFT the negation 
of a spare gate is the negation of the logical output of the gate; 
the negation of a PAND gate with inputs A and B means 
that  did not occur, B did not occur or A occurred after 
B; 
if the PAND is true for simultaneous events, then the nega-
tion of the PAND is not; and 
the negation of the DFT constraints, such as FDEP, SEQ 
(Sequence Enforcing constraint) and CCG (common-
cause group) is inconsequential, since none of the con-
straints has a logical output. 
6. A method for performing probabilistic risk assessment 
as set forth in claim 1, further comprising: 
integrating a Dynamic Fault Tree model into an Event Tree 
based risk assessment methodology. 
7. The method of claim 6, further including providing 
Dynamic Fault Tree nodes as pivot nodes in the Event Tree 
based risk assessment methodology. 
8. The method of claim 7, further including said method 
accounting for dependencies between events. 
9. The method of claim 8, further including accounting for 
dependencies including imperfect coverage, functional 
dependencies and/or shared spaces. 
10. The method of claim 6, further including accounting for 
dynamic systems with shared events using modularization. 
11. The method of claim 10, further including analyzing 
related units within a module and dealing with non-related 
modules independently. 
12. The method of claim 6, further including modularizing 
• dynamic fault tree for a pivot node and solving the same via 
• combination of Binary Decision Diagram and Markov mod-
els. 
13. The method of claim 6, further including when events 
are shared between dynamic fault trees being used as pivot 
nodes in an event tree, the dynamic fault trees are combined 
using logical operations to product a combined dynamic fault 
tree. 
